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Contributory Negligence in Medical
Malpractice
W. David Alderson*
T HREE CATEGORIES OF CASES have been noted' out of the mass
of factually individualistic ones concerning medical mal-
practice and contributory negligence. The first, where a breach
of duty owed the patient by the physician is lacking, involves
an injury produced by the patient's own negligence. In the sec-
ond, the patient's negligence directly contributes to the severity
of an injury already present because of the physician's negli-
gence. The plaintiff-patient's damages are not mitigated but
rather entirely precluded in light of his acts. 2 Thus a plea of
contributory negligence is a complete defense. The third category
includes those cases where a time lag exists between the separate
negligent acts, each of which produces significant injury. The
physician is chargeable only with the consequences of his own
negligence, not subsequent acts of his patient.3
Recognizing these generalized differences, it would be bene-
ficial to an understanding of this field of tort law to review the
nature of contributory negligence and its application to medical
malpractice litgation. Cases will follow to crystallize some of this
fundamental law.
Contributory negligence is
• . . an act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, constitut-
ing a failure to exercise the care which ordinarily prudent
persons are accustomed to employ for their own safety which,
concurring or co-operating with the negligent acts of the de-
fendant, is a proximate cause of the injury of which the
plaintiff complains.4
In many cases, it is a complete defense.5 As far as the law is con-
* B.S., Univ. of Idaho; M.B.A., Univ. of Wisconsin; Third-year student at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Annot., 17 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1242 (1909).
2 Id., at 1243.
3 Ibid.
4 Champs v. Stone, 74 Ohio App. 344, 58 N. E. 2d 803 (1944).
5 Prosser, Law of Torts 284 (2d ed., 1955). There is a split of authority
here. (1) Any negligence on the part of the plaintiff which is a con-
(Continued on next page)
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
cerned the parties should be left in the relative positions in which
they were found.
When applied to cases of medical malpractice, the reason-
able-prudent standard for acts of commission or omission
amounting to contributory negligence is slightly changed."
. . . the patient is required to exercise for his own welfare
that degree of care and prudence which would be used by
an ordinary, careful and prudent patient in the same circum-
stances.7
Care and prudence, actually influenced by the awareness of cer-
tain facts, are imprecise concepts when viewed in the unequal
relation of patient-physician. The factual circumstances of each
new case make precedent usually inapplicable; the formation of
definitive law nearly impossible.
This type of litigation is unique in the amount of critical con-
cern which must be focused upon the usually long time period
between the initial injury and the subsequent acts of the parties.
The physician's ministrations and the day-to-day fluctuations in
his patient's condition must be scrutinized. The long period of
treatment requires that the doctor's actions be evaluated in view
of his overall performance. The patient's negligence, which may
be cumulative in causation, must also be evaluated. The patient
is often inactive during the time of treatment; contributory neg-
ligence cannot be established.8 It could be established, however,
by looking for a failure of cooperation or failure to submit to
treatment and reliance upon the physician. Procedurally, each
distinctly different factual situation must be carefully molded to
the law; a law which is, at least, somewhat confused.9
(Continued from preceding page)
tributing cause of the second injury will defeat recovery: Stahl v. Southern
Michigan Ry., 211 Mich. 350, 178 N. W. 710 (1920); Koonse v. Standard Steel
Works Co., 221 Mo. App. 1231, 300 S. W. 531 (1927). (2) Recovery from
the defendant will be allowed unless the plaintiff's negligence amounts to
an intervening cause and proximately contributes to the second injury:
S. S. Kresge Co. v. Kenney, 86 F. 2d 651 (D. C. Cir. 1936); Yarbrough v.
Polar Ice & Fuel Co., 118 Ind. App. 321, 79 N. E. 2d 422 (1948).
6 Flynn v. Stearns, 52 N. J. Super. 115, 145 A. 2d 33 (1958); Halverson v.
Zimmerman, 60 N. D. 113, 232 N. W. 754 (1930); Wemmett v. Mount, 134
Ore. 305, 292 Pac. 93 (1930).
7 Carnahan, The Dentist and The Law 55, 61 (1st ed., 1955).
8 Stetler & Moritz, Doctor and Patient and the Law, 368 (4th ed., 1962;
Shartel & Plant, The Law of Medical Practice 153 (1st ed., 1959).





The problematical issue of causation is most easily discussed
through case illustration. To establish a valid defense, the pati-
ent's negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. 10
In Stacy v. Williams," the patient was treated for a broken
leg over a period of eighty-three days. The bones were placed in
apposition, splinted, and suspended by pulley and weights. In
this position the fracture should have healed. However, the
patient removed the splint from his leg, allowing it to lie flat
upon the bed. Repeated cautioning by the physician against such
action was ineffective. The patient simply procured others to
lower his leg, thereby permitting a desired shift in his body
position. It was soon apparent that the leg was not and would
not heal. Thereupon, an open reduction operation was per-
formed in which the bones were placed in apposition and secured
in place by screws and a metal plate. In addition, a plaster cast
was used to keep the leg immobile. In spite of this, Williams
twisted and turned the cast with his hands, swung the leg from
side to side with the aid of his other leg, whittled away the cast
with a knife taken from one of his meal trays, and opened and
closed the bandages over the incision. Consequently, an infection
set in which caused improper knitting of the bones. The doctor
resorted to a second cast, one which extended around the pa-
tient's body. Undeterred, Williams continued to be uncoopera-
tive, causing his subsequent removal to another hospital. At the
trial level, the patient was awarded $5,500 in damages. In re-
versing this decision, the Appellate Court stated that a person
whose acts amount to moral delinquency is deemed to be in pari
delicto with the negligent physician and, therefore, will be de-
nied recovery upon the principle of contributory negligence.
In a similar factual situation the patient in Leonardo v.
Sloan-12 left the hospital for two days without permission, did not
follow a prescribed diet, and removed the dressing from his skin
graft. Proximate cause could not be established where the evi-
dence proved that none of his acts had any effect upon his re-
covery or upon the prior negligence of the physician. Recovery
was allowed.
10 Halverson v. Zimmerman, supra n. 6; Wemmett v. Mount, supra n. 6;
see generally 70 C. J. S. 973.
11 253 Ky. 353, 69 S. W. 2d 697 (1934).
12 23 D. & C. 2d 201 (1959).
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An important facet of proximate cause involves the proximity
of the patient's acts to those of the physician. The former must
occur simultaneously and in cooperation with the latter.1 They
must be the direct, active, producing, and efficient cause. 14 Where
the patient's negligence follows, by any significant time, that of
the physician, the case is one of subsequent or supervening negli-
gence. This results, in practical effect, in mitigation of the award,
not necessarily an elimination of it. 1' For example, where a
minor received negligent treatment for a broken arm, her sub-
sequent failure to exercise the arm as directed was an omission
which aggravated the previous injury. Her recoverable damages
were reduced accordingly. 10
Patient's Duty to Follow Instructions
Failure to follow the reasonable instructions prescribed by
a physician has been held to be contributory negligence. 17 This
is a general rule which imposes a duty upon the patient.' 8 In a
case'19 on point, the doctor had placed a cast on a child's broken
arm in such a manner that the blood flow through the arm was
severely constricted. When the arm began to swell, the defendant
requested that his patient remain in the hospital. The patient's
father refused to comply with the request and as a consequence,
the arm became infected and began to deteriorate. The physician's
13 Halverson v. Zimmerman, supra n. 6; Leadingham v. Hillman, 224 Ky.
177, 5 S. W. 2d 1044 (1928).
14 Breece v. Ragan, 234 Mo. App. 1093, 138 S. W. 2d 758 (1940); Sanderson
v. Holland, 39 Mo. App. 233 (1889); Hibbard v. Thompson, 109 Mass. 286
(1872).
15 Flynn v. Stearns, supra n. 6; Maertins v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 162
Cal. App. 2d 661, 328 P. 2d 494 (1958); Josselyn v. Dearborn, 143 Me. 328,
62 A. 2d 174 (1948); Leadingham v. Hillman, supra n. 13; Schultz v. Tasche,
166 Wis. 561, 165 N. W. 292 (1917) ; Sauers v. Smits, 49 Wash. 557, 95 P. 1097
(1908); McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N. C. 799, 29 S. E. 354 (1898); DuBois
v. Decker, 130 N. Y. 325, 29 N. E. 313 (1891); Sanderson v. Holland, supra
n. 15; Wilmot v. Howard, 39 Vt. 447, 94 Am. Dec. 338 (1867).
16 Flynn v. Stearns, supra n. 6.
17 Brown v. Dark, 196 Ark. 724, 119 S. W. 2d 529 (1938).
18 Josselyn v. Dearborn, supra n. 15; Lucas v. Hambrecht, 1 Il. App. 2d 226,
117 N. E. 2d 306 (1954); Donathan v. McConnell, 121 Mont. 230, 193 P. 2d
819 (1948); Chapman v. Loer, 193 Wash. 569, 76 P. 2d 600 (1938); Mc-
Donnell v. Monteith, 59 N. D. 750, 231 N. W. 854 (1930); Chubb v. Holmes,
111 Conn. 482, 150 A. 516 (1930); McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124
(1930); Feltman v. Dunn, 52 S. D. 187, 217 N. W. 198 (1927); Gentile v.
DeVirgilis, 290 Pa. 50, 138 A. 540 (1927); Hanson v. Thelan, 42 N. D. 617,
173 N. W. 457 (1919); Dunman v. Raney, 118 Ark. 337, 176 S. W. 339 (1915);
Merrill v. Odiorne, 113 Me. 424, 94 A. 753 (1915).




liability for the injury was absolved by the father's failure to
follow the reasonable instructions.
Cases involving reasonable, ordinary, and usual treatments
adhere to the same duty principle. 20 A duty to submit to treat-
ment is fixed even though the patient may be ignorant of the
consequences of a refusal.2 1 Should a particular treatment be
refused, the doctor may care for his patient in all other par-
ticulars without incurring liability for malpractice in the course
pursued.2 2
Littlejohn v. Arbogast 23 concerned such a duty. The patient
had a broken back and dislocated hip, but neither he nor those
in charge of him would allow the doctor to apply the proper
treatment. Contributory negligence formed the basis for disal-
lowing the claim. The Court reasoned that, with the existence
of a duty to submit to necessary treatment, if the patient was
delirious and without faculties to understand the necessity for
the treatment, then his immediate family was empowered to con-
sent. However, where both patient and family refuse, the
physician is not required to use force in overcoming the opposi-
tion; and he is, thereby, absolved of any liability for resulting
injury.
In a subsequent decision, 24 the duty to submit was judged by
what the patient knew relative to the information she received
from her physician. The patient had undergone surgery for
varicose veins. Subsequently, she was in constant pain ap-
parently caused by a paravertebral block, for which she re-
peatedly refused treatment. During the trial, she testified that
she had no recollection of declining treatment, but this was over-
come by the hospital records listing the date of each refusal.
The Court's decision denied contributory negligence by placing
a continuing duty upon the physician. Where his patient is in-
competent or incapable of understanding the necessity for treat-
20 Josselyn v. Dearborn, supra n. 15; Carey v. Mercer, 239 Mass. 599, 132
N. E. 353 (1921); Summers v. Tarpley, 208 S. W. 266 (Mo. App. 1919);
Peterson v. Branton, 137 Minn. 74, 162 N. W. 895 (1917); Merrill v. Odiorne,
supra n. 18; McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 P. 870 (1912); Haering
v. Spicer, 92 Ill. App. 449 (1900). See generally 70 C. J. S. op. cit. supra
n. 10 at 974.
21 Carey v. Mercer, ibid.
22 Shannon v. Ramsey, 288 Mass. 543, 193 N. E. 235 (1934); Routt v. Ready,
265 F. 455 (C. A., D. C. 1920).
23 95 IlM. App. 605 (1900).
24 Steele v. Woods, 327 S, W. 2d 187 (Mo. 1959).
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ment he must advise the husband or member of the immediate
family, one able to speak for the patient, of the urgent need.
Any failure to do so destroys his defense.
Reliance on the Physician
Negligence is not established, prima facie, when a patient,
unaware of improper treatment, relies on and trusts the pro-
fessional skill of his physician, thereby not calling in other
physicians for advice.2 5 In Los Alamos Medical Center v. Coe 2 6
the patient, having been discharged from the hospital, was assured
by her physician that she could be given morphine whenever
she felt a need for it. Soon after inquiries of the husband and
wife were satisfied by the physician, she became a drug addict.
No contributory negligence was found when the Court con-
sidered reliance upon the physician's advice, even though the
patient, in order to obtain the drug, had often complained of pain
when none was present.
Although under a duty to follow a recommended treatment,
a patient has no duty to reiterate her entire medical history to
every person on the hospital staff with whom she comes in con-
tact.27 Mrs. Favalora was admitted to her physician's hospital to
undergo observation for determining the cause of her fainting
spells. She was prepared by the administration of opaque chemi-
cal compounds for a series of fluoroscopic and x-ray examinations
of her chest, gall bladder, and gastro-intestinal tract. While
standing before a fluoroscope, she became dizzy, collapsed, and
suffered multiple injuries. Contributory negligence was ruled
out when the Court stated that she was entitled to rely, not only
on the skill of her own physician, but also upon the com-
petence of specialists into whose care she was committed. They
had access to her medical records and, therefore, should have
known that she was subject to such spells.
A patient may not rely on the professional skill of a physician
25 Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 291 P. 2d 79 (1950); Halverson v. Zim-
merman, supra n. 6; Schoonover v. Holden, 87 N. W. 737 (Iowa, 1901);
DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N. W. 146 (1881). See generally 70
C. J. S. op. cit. supra n. 10 at 975.
There is no prima facie negligence where, following the infliction of an
injury caused by a negligent physician, he is discharged and another em-
ployed: McClees v. Cohen, supra n. 18; George v. Shannon, 92 Kan. 801,
142 P. 967 (1914).
26 58 N. Mex. 686, 275 P. 2d 175 (1954).
27 Favalora v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 144 S. 2d 544 (La. App. 1962).
Sept., 1963
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss3/7
CONTRIB. IN MALPRACTICE 461
when he is fully aware that the doctor is not treating him prop-
erly. 28 In a situation where a patient had undergone two negli-
gent treatments on a fractured arm, he would not be contribu-
torily negligent if he refused to have his arm rebroken for a
third time. 29 Champs v. Stone30 presented a patient who was
persuaded to submit to a blood test by a physician he knew to be
intoxicated. As a result, the doctor's needle penetrated the bone
of the forearm, thereby causing a bone infection. Contributory
negligence as a matter of law barred recovery. In this situation,
ordinary care for one's safety would have caused the careful
and prudent person to seriously doubt the physician's capability
and therefore refuse treatment.
28 Halverson v. Zimmerman, supra n. 6; Hanley v. Spencer, 108 Colo. 184,
115 P. 2d 399 (1941).
29 Parr v. Young, 121 Kan. 47, 246 P. 181 (1926).
30 Supra n. 4.
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